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I. Announcing the Discovery of a Mutation
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA)1 was signed into
law on May 21, 2008.2 In general, GINA prohibits employers and health
insurers from obtaining genetic information or using it to make adverse
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1. Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) (codified at scattered sections of 42, 29 and
26 U.S.C.).
2. See Derrick Cain, Bush Signs Legislation to Prohibit Genetic Discrimination in the
Workplace, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 99 (May 22, 2008).
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decisions against individuals.3 GINA has been hailed as the “`first civil rights
act of the 21st Century.’”4 Politically, it was an overwhelmingly popular piece
of legislation, with the Senate passing it unanimously and the House passing
it with only one vote in opposition.5 Its enactment was widely applauded, with
the New York Times, for example, declaring that “lawmakers rightly saw that
fairness and public policy arguments demanded a ban on discriminating
against people for genetic traits they can do nothing about.”6
For all of its accolades, however, GINA also is a conundrum. It is the first
employment discrimination statute passed without a history of discrimination
against the protected class. Accordingly, one commentator labeled it “the first
preemptive antidiscrimination statute in American history,”7 and further noted
that it is “perhaps the first antidiscrimination statute passed without an
associated identity group.”8 One might say that genetic testing of GINA has
revealed it to be a mutant antidiscrimination statute, differing in significant
ways from prior antidiscrimination laws.
The discovery of such a mutation should be monumental. However, it has
been argued that GINA, at least in practice, may turn out to be much ado about
very little.9 Genetic information employment discrimination was not a
problem when GINA was passed, and it may never have become a problem
even without the passage of GINA. With the new law, it seems very unlikely
that a significant problem will emerge regarding genetic information

3. Title I of GINA covers health insurance, and Title II addresses employment
discrimination. This essay focuses on Title II.
4. Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. 439, 475 (2010) (quoting Senator Judd Gregg and the
late Senator Edward Kennedy). Senator Kennedy actually referred to GINA as “the first civil
rights bill of the new century of life sciences.” David H. Kaye, Commentary, GINA’s
Genotypes, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 51, 51 (2010); Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar,
Senate Backs Privacy for Genetic Data, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2008.
5. See Cain, supra note 2; Editorial, A Ban on Genetic Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
22, 2009, at WK9.
6. Editorial, supra note 5. Of course, those regulated by GINA viewed it less favorably.
See id. (discussing opposition of “[s]ome insurance companies and business groups”); Patricia
Alten, Abstract, GINA: A Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Solution in Search of a
Problem, 61 FLA. L. REV. 379, 389 (2009) (“Employers argued vehemently against GINA.”);
Roberts, supra note 4, at 448-49 (discussing the opposition group known as the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination in Employment Coalition); see also Kevin P. McGowan,
Employer Advocates Remain Wary of New Bias Law’s Potential Effects, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 99, at C-1 (May 22, 2008).
7. Roberts, supra note 4, at 441.
8. Id. at 484.
9. See id. at 462 (“[L]ittle evidence indicates that genetic-information discrimination is
currently taking place on a large scale.”).
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discrimination.10 So, maybe this mutation is not so monumental. Perhaps it
will fade almost unnoticed into the annals of antidiscrimination law.
From a theoretical perspective, however, GINA is well worth considering
as an aberrant antidiscrimination law, and reconsidering it as something other
than just an antidiscrimination mutant. A law like none other before it may
have significant theoretical implications. It may reveal something important
about the current state of our employment laws, as well as the history, and
perhaps the future. If GINA is such an exceptional law, how did it come to be
enacted? Does its enactment suggest possible trends for the future of
employment law? Ruminating about GINA may elucidate some truths about
how employment law, politics, and societal values interact and provide some
insight into future employment laws.
GINA is undoubtedly an exceptional antidiscrimination law, and I will treat
it as such. However, when one tests GINA, one finds that GINA is not just a
mutant antidiscrimination statute, but also a hybrid — part antidiscrimination
statute and part privacy law.11
Most of GINA’s ancestors are employment antidiscrimination laws that say
little about privacy. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196412 and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)13 do not prohibit
employers from inquiring about or revealing to others an employee’s color,
race, sex, religion, national origin, or age. Under both of those laws, often
there is no secrecy or privacy regarding these characteristics because they are
easily discernible by observation or other means without making inquiry. In
cases in which the protected characteristic is not obvious, an employer may be
well advised not to ask about it, but that is because such an inquiry may help
the employee prove that an adverse employment action was taken because of
the protected characteristic — not because the statute protects the privacy of
the information. On the other hand, the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA),14 although predominantly an antidiscrimination statute, does
10. Beyond litigation, GINA may play a significant role in alleviating people’s fears about
genetic testing and thereby facilitate genetic research. See, e.g., id. at 471-74. However, it is
far from certain that GINA will have that effect. See id. at 488-89 (positing that GINA may
“legitimiz[e] the very fears it sought to relieve”).
11. I am not the first commentator to recognize the privacy DNA in genetic discrimination.
See, e.g., Gaia Bernstein, The Paradoxes of Technological Diffusion: Genetic Discrimination
and Internet Privacy, 39 CONN. L. REV. 241 (2006); Pauline T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination,
Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee Protections for a Brave New Workplace, 96 NW. U. L.
REV. 1497 (2002); see also MATTHEW W. FINKIN, PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 31-34 (3d
ed. 2009).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-633a (2006).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2006 & Supp. III 2009). Another federal employment
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have a less prominent privacy aspect. The ADA, in a limited way, prohibits
inquiries regarding disabilities,15 but the statutory language of the Act and the
litigation thereunder are predominantly about nondiscrimination.16 In contrast,
the statutory language of GINA is devoted more to protecting the privacy of
genetic information17 than to antidiscrimination.18 As discussed more fully
below,19 part of GINA’s section declaring unlawful practices reads more like
a privacy protection statute, similar to that in the Employee Polygraph
Protection Act of 1988,20 than an antidiscrimination law.
Part II of this essay considers GINA as a nonprototypical (mutant)
antidiscrimination law and discusses its improbable enactment. Part III
evaluates the privacy aspects of GINA, thus typing it as a hybrid privacyantidiscrimination law. Part IV discusses what the enactment of a mutanthybrid employment law may presage for future employment laws. Is the
enactment of GINA the beginning of an evolutionary trend or a one-time
mutation?
II. The Improbable Enactment of a Mutant Antidiscrimination Law
A. GINA as a Mutant Antidiscrimination Law
GINA is unusual as an antidiscrimination statute. It was enacted after about
a thirteen-year track record in Congress,21 with no history of discrimination
and no multitude of discrimination victims clamoring for justice. How did
such an antidiscrimination law become enacted and what, if anything, does it
tell us about future laws?
It is tempting to proclaim that GINA is not an antidiscrimination statute at
all.22 It does not, after all, actually prohibit discrimination based on a
characteristic that a person has, such as race, color, sex, national origin,
religion, age, or disability, but instead it prohibits discrimination based on
genetic information and testing. One aspect of this distinction is that the
discrimination statute is the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2006). The Act
prohibits discrimination based on handicap, but its coverage is limited to employment by the
federal government, federal government contractors, and recipients of federal funds.
15. See id. § 12112(d) (prohibiting certain medical inquiries).
16. See id. § 12112(a)-(b) (prohibiting discrimination).
17. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff-1(b)-(c), 2000ff-5.
18. See id. § 2000ff-1 (a).
19. See discussion infra Part III.
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (2006).
21. See Roberts, supra note 4, at 447-51 (detailing GINA’s path to law).
22. See Kim, supra note 11, at 1524 (“[T]he most commonly accepted justifications for
forbidding race and other prohibited forms of discrimination do not necessarily apply to
employer discrimination based on genetic traits.”).
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genetic trait itself is not the thing that is protected, but information about it,
which usually is generated by testing or inquiring.23 Yet, ultimately it is the
genetic trait that is being protected. Although this aspect of GINA does
distinguish it from the other employment discrimination statutes in most cases,
it does not make it unique among antidiscrimination laws. An employer
cannot discriminate because of a protected characteristic unless the employer
knows the employee possesses that characteristic. Most of the characteristics
covered by antidiscrimination statutes are readily observable in most cases,
and there is no question about the employer’s knowledge. However, in cases
in which they are not, as in some cases of religion,24 disability,25 and
pregnancy,26 the plaintiff must prove the employer’s knowledge. Thus,
GINA’s protection of genetic information and testing differs somewhat from
other antidiscrimination laws, but not much.
A second aspect of the distinction between protecting personal
characteristics and genetic information and testing is that there is no welldefined class of people protected by GINA.27 For race, national origin, and sex
(including pregnancy), in most cases persons can be classified in a group.
However, this aspect of GINA also does not distinguish it from all other
antidiscrimination laws in all cases. Consider, for example, that religion and
disability often do not involve well-defined classes. With race and sex, there
are only a few races and two sexes, and we know the races and sex that
historically have been discriminated against in employment. In contrast, with
religion and disability, there are an almost infinite number of classifications
23. See Roberts, supra note 4, at 482-83 (“Discriminating on the basis of genetic
information often relies on testing and scientific expertise, making genetic-information
discrimination patently different from discrimination on the basis of race, sex, age, or disability.
To face the kind of discrimination covered by GINA, most individuals will have to opt-in to the
category of potential victims by taking genetic tests.”).
24. See, e.g., Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2003) (“It is difficult
to see how an employer can be charged with discrimination on the basis of an employee's
religion when he doesn't know the employee's religion . . . .”).
25. See, e.g., EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin, Inc., 554 F.3d 1102, 1104 (7th Cir. 2009)
(“Certainly an ADA plaintiff must demonstrate a causal connection between an employer's
adverse action and its knowledge of her disability.”).
26. See, e.g., Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup, Int’l, Inc., 82 F.3d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 1996) (“We
cannot presume that an employer most likely practiced unlawful discrimination when it did not
know that the plaintiff even belonged to the protected class. The employer's knowledge, in this
class of cases, is a critical element of the plaintiff's prima facie case.”).
27. See Kim, supra note 11, at 1520 (“One obvious reason that no widespread animus is
directed against persons with genetic anomalies is that those individuals do not constitute a
socially recognized group. Even conceptualizing the relevant disadvantaged `group’ raises
some difficulties, given that each individual’s genetic material contains some anomalies that
predispose to disease.”); Roberts, supra note 4, at 484 (characterizing GINA as an
antidiscrimination statute “passed without an associated identity group”).
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within each, and the history of discrimination is less focused. Age also
presents the same diffuse group issues in the context of the ADEA, as age
spreads out over a continuum from age forty upward. Of the characteristics
covered by antidiscrimination laws before GINA, disability yields the most
amorphous class,28 and the issue of coverage (whether one has a disability) has
been the dominant issue in much of the litigation under the ADA.29
In the end, one can say that genetic discrimination differs from other types
of discrimination and that GINA is a different kind of antidiscrimination
statute, but it has enough DNA to belong to the antidiscrimination family.
B. Enactment Without the Usual Pedigree of an Antidiscrimination Law
Before GINA was enacted there were three federal employment
antidiscrimination laws that covered several characteristics: Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (covering color, race, sex, religion, and national
origin);30 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA); 31 and
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990.32 There are, of course,
state and local laws that cover some traits not covered by federal laws.33 In
about forty-six years since the formal recognition of employment
discrimination law, it has not been easy for new traits to be added, although
there have been numerous candidates. There is no comprehensive list of
factors that lead to passage of an antidiscrimination law, but the following are
often mentioned: 1) moral objection to the discrimination; 2) a cohesive and
identifiable group of people that would be covered; 3) a history of
discrimination against people who possess the characteristic; 4) immutability
of the characteristic;34 and 5) irrelevance of the characteristic to job

28. See Michael Selmi, Interpreting the Americans With Disabilities Act: Why the Supreme
Court ReWrote the Statute, and Why Congress Did Not Care, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 533
(2008) (“[T]he need to define the protected class renders disability statutes different from other
antidiscrimination statutes, and there is no accepted way to define disability.”).
29. See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Antidiscrimination
Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 91 (2000).
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
31. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-633a (2006).
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
33. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-1401.02(22), 2-1402.11 (personal appearance); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. 23:351 (sickle cell trait); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2202 (height and weight);
SANTA CRUZ, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 9.83.010, 9.83.020(13) (physical appearance).
34. Regarding the importance of immutability as a unifying principle that explains all of
the protected characteristics in employment discrimination law, see Sharona Hoffman, The
Importance of Immutability in Employment Discrimination Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1483,
1544 (2011).
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performance.35 As already discussed, GINA does not score well on the
important factors of a history of discrimination and a cohesive and identifiable
covered group. However, another thing that characterizes all laws that are
enacted is political support. GINA was supported by the scientific research
community and the private biotechnology sector.36
With the enactment of GINA, genetic information and genetic testing
achieved coverage without the usual pedigree and arguably jumped ahead of
other candidates for employment discrimination protection. The most obvious
example of a characteristic supplanted by GINA is sexual orientation, a
characteristic with a better pedigree for coverage and a track record of
legislative efforts, beginning in Congress in 1994.37 The proposed
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) would add sexual orientation
and, as recently introduced, gender identity, to the characteristics protected by
the federal antidiscrimination laws.38 Yet, GINA was enacted before ENDA.
Another predictor of the likelihood of enactment of new federal
antidiscrimination laws is the enactment of such laws by states. On that factor,
GINA had the advantage over ENDA. Genetic information and testing was
covered by laws in a majority of states — about thirty-four — before GINA
became federal law.39 In contrast, sexual orientation is not yet covered by a

35. See Peggie R. Smith, Parental-Status Employment Discrimination: A Wrong in Need
of a Right, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 569, 601 (2002) (listing immutability, relevance, history
of discrimination, and political power).
36. See, e.g., Perry W. Payne, Jr., Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008: The
Federal Answer for Genetic Discrimination, 5 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 33, 41-42 (2009)
(“Companies, similar to genetic researchers, see genetic information nondiscrimination
legislation as critical to their business model.”). I am grateful to Professor Pauline Kim for
pointing out the important role of the scientific community in supporting the enactment of
GINA.
37. See, e.g., Jill D. Weinberg, Gender Nonconformity: An Analysis of Perceived Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity Protection Under the Employment Non-Discrimination Act,
44 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 8-13 (2009) (chronicling legislative efforts).
38. H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 1584, 111th Cong. (2009).
39. See Daniel Schlein, New Frontiers for Genetic Privacy Law: The Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 311, 347 (2009); see also National
Conference of State Legislatures, Genetic Privacy Laws, http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/
Health/GeneticPrivacyLaws/tabid/14287/Default.aspx (last updated Mar. 2008).
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majority of state laws,40 although we may be on the brink of Congressional
passage of ENDA.
In addition to sexual orientation, other candidates for employment
antidiscrimination coverage for which a good case has been made include
caregiver status,41 family status,42 and appearance.43 Whether GINA “broke in
line” ahead of ENDA or other possible antidiscrimination laws to achieve
coverage for genetic information and testing, it is clear that it enjoyed a
relatively rapid ascent without some of the qualifications possessed by other
candidates for coverage.
Given the improbable enactment of GINA without the supporting history
of discrimination, one commentator contemplated the mutant
antidiscrimination law and asked whether it is a harbinger of a new race of
mutant preemptive antidiscrimination laws.44 I think, however, that the key to
unlocking the mystery of GINA’s improbable birth and any prognostications
for the future based on its emergence lies in its hybrid nature. It leapt to the
front of the antidiscrimination pack without the standard pedigree largely
because it is not just an antidiscrimination law. It is also part privacy law.
III. Improbable Enactment of a Hybrid Antidiscrimination/Privacy Law
A. GINA as a Hybrid Antidiscrimination/Privacy Law
Before GINA became law, genetic information was viewed by many as a
privacy issue, and it was argued that privacy law offered a more appropriate
40. The current number seems to be twenty-one states and the District of Columbia. See
Maps of State Laws & Policies, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/
resources/Employment_Laws_and_Policies.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2011). Colorado was the
twentieth state to enact such a law in 2008. See Tripp Baltz, Colorado Governor Signs
Legislation Expanding Workplace Protections for Gays, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 109, at A-8
(June 6, 2008). Delaware followed in 2009. See Lorraine McCarthy, Delaware Governor Signs
Bill Banning Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 126, at
A-10 (July 6, 2009).
41. The EEOC issued a guidance document in 2007 on such discrimination. EEOC,
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: UNLAWFUL DISPARATE TREATMENT OF WORKERS WITH CAREGIVING
RESPONSIBILITIES NO. 915.002 (2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/care
giving.html. The EEOC later issued Employer Best Practices for Workers with Caregiving
Responsibilities, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiver-best-practices.html.
See generally Nicole Buonocore Porter, Why Care About Caregivers? Using Communitarian
Theory to Justify Protection of Real Workers, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 355 (2010).
42. See Smith, supra note 35, at 606-07.
43. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE INJUSTICE OF APPEARANCE IN LIFE
AND LAW 117-43 (2010) (examining legal challenges and frameworks for discrimination based
on appearance).
44. See Roberts, supra note 4, at 441, 489-90.
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treatment than antidiscrimination law.45 What is the difference? First, the
interests implicated by privacy are distinct from those implicated by
antidiscrimination. Antidiscrimination law addresses interests in equal
treatment of similarly situated individuals and antisubordination of historically
disadvantaged groups,46 whereas privacy deals with a person’s “right to be let
alone.”47 Privacy is a complicated concept and includes interests such as
secrecy of information and autonomy.48 Second, the forms of the laws are
different. Antidiscrimination laws focus on discriminatory motive--prohibiting
employers from taking adverse employment actions because of a
characteristic.49 Workplace privacy laws, on the other hand, tend to prohibit
employers from taking certain actions that constitute invasions of the protected
privacy interest without regard for the motive.50
So which is GINA — antidiscrimination law or privacy law? Both. In
name, it is an antidiscrimination law. As discussed above, it has some
characteristics of an antidiscrimination law, but it also lacks some. It is written
in the language of an antidiscrimination law, prohibiting employment
discrimination because of genetic information.51 However, it also is written
in the language of a workplace privacy law, prohibiting employers from
“request[ing], requir[ing], or purchas[ing]” genetic information.52 Indeed,

45. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 11; Kim, supra note 11.
46. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 40-42 (2006).
47. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
193 (1890).
48. See Kim, supra note 11, at 1535; Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF.
L. REV. 1087, 1099-1124 (2002).
49. See Kim, supra note 11, at 1537. I do not mean to ignore disparate impact, which is
a theory of nonintentional discrimination. However, intentional discrimination is the focus of
antidiscrimination law, and most charges and lawsuits allege intentional discrimination.
50. Id.
51. See 42 U.S.C. 2000ff-1(a) (Supp. II 2008):
XX a) Discrimination Based on Genetic Information. — It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer —
XX(1) to fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge, any employee, or otherwise to
discriminate against any employee with respect to the compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment of the employee, because of genetic
information with respect to the employee; or
XX(2) to limit, segregate, or classify the employees of the employer in any way
that would deprive or tend to deprive any employee of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect the status of the employee as an employee, because
of genetic information with respect to the employee.
Id.
52. Id. § 2000ff-1(b).
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years before the passage of GINA, Professor Pauline Kim, in urging passage
of a privacy law rather than an antidiscrimination law, argued:
If regulating employer use of genetic information is primarily a
problem of protecting informational privacy, rather than preventing
invidious discrimination, the appropriate legal response looks quite
different. Any legal effort will focus on defining and controlling
the flow of critical information, rather than determining the motive
of the employer in taking adverse personnel actions.53
Thus, GINA has both antidiscrimination and privacy DNA. This might not
be apparent, however, given the name of the law and the assignment of
enforcement jurisdiction to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). The EEOC is the agency charged with enforcement of the federal
employment antidiscrimination laws.54
B. GINA: Rare Enactment of a Federal Workplace Privacy Law
Just as enactment of employment antidiscrimination laws is difficult and
politically charged, it is no simple task to pass workplace privacy legislation.
Employees claim various expectations of privacy in the workplace, and
employers counter, claiming a need to monitor or discover things that
employees prefer to keep secret. Consider, for example, the topical issue of
electronic and computer monitoring in the workplace. While employees claim
a right of privacy in their communications, employers justify their “invasions”
based on their needs to ensure productivity, secure confidential information,
and avoid legal liability for communications by employees.55 To appreciate
the significance of the enactment of GINA as a federal workplace privacy law,
it is instructive to consider another privacy law that was enacted — the
Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (EPPA)56 — and a workplace
privacy issue that remains largely unregulated by federal law — electronic and
computer monitoring.
Enacted at a time when employer polygraphing of employees and applicants
was rampant,57 the EPPA pronounced a virtual ban on the administering of lie
detectors.58 The language of the prohibitory section of the EPPA is similar to

53. See Kim, supra note 11, at 1543.
54. See Laws Enforced by EEOC, U.S. E.E.O.C., http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/index.
cfm (last visited June 10, 2011).
55. See, e.g., FINKIN, supra note 11, at 281.
56. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2008 (2006).
57. S. REP. NO. 100-284, at 3 (1988) (stating that “over two million polygraphs were
administered annually”).
58. “Lie detector” is defined more broadly than polygraph. See 29 U.S.C. § 2001(3).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss1/1

2011]

WHAT IS IN GINA’S GENES?

11

the language in section 202(b) of GINA,59 declaring it unlawful for an
employer to “directly or indirectly . . . require, request, suggest, or cause any
employee or prospective employee to take or submit to any lie detector test”60
or “to use, accept, refer to, or inquire concerning the results of any lie detector
test of any employee or prospective employee.”61
The EPPA should be seen as a monumental workplace privacy statute — a
statue that essentially prohibits an employment practice that employers used
pervasively for the purpose of protecting clear, legitimate, and undeniable
interests.62 Compare Congress’s definitive ban on the use of lie detectors with
its refusal to date to impose any limits on employers’ monitoring of
employees’ computer and Internet use. Employers’ electronic monitoring of
employees is pervasive and growing.63
Electronic monitoring, like lie
detectors and genetic testing, is an example of science and technology
advancing and making discoverable previously private information, thus
pitting employers’ legitimate business and workplace regulation interests
against the privacy interests of employees.64 In contrast to the virtual ban on
the use of lie detectors by the EPPA, there is very little federal regulation of
employers’ electronic monitoring of employees.65 Congress has considered
59. See Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) (codified at scattered sections of 42, 29
and 26 U.S.C.).
60. 29 U.S.C. § 2002(1).
61. Id. § 2002(2).
62. Employers most often used polygraphs to protect property interests — most commonly
to predict or investigate thefts of property. See, e.g., Brad V. Driscoll, Note, The Employee
Polygraph Protection Act of 1988: A Balance of Interests, 75 IOWA L. REV. 539, 554 (1990).
63. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 11, at 273-77; Press Release, American Management
Association, 2007 Electronic Monitoring & Surveillance Survey (Feb. 28, 2008), http://press.
amanet.org/press-releases/177/2007-electronic-monitoring-surveillance-survey/.
64. See Bernstein, supra note 11, at 252 (“Although the history of technologies — such as
wiretapping — manifests a social aspiration toward balancing technological diffusion and
privacy protection, these resolutions are not always achieved. In some cases, an equilibrium
may occur only decades later.”); id. at 241 (“New technologies often cause social controversies
by creating novel privacy threats.”).
65. Although some would cite the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Stored
Communications Act, they have had little impact on the practice of employer electronic
monitoring or litigation regarding those practices. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
of 1986 (ECPA), Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.), which amended the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, and the Stored Communications Act (SCA), which is Title II of the ECPA, predated
widespread use of the Internet and many of the modern means of electronic communication.
Thus, the laws were not written in terms that fit well with modern electronic communications.
Furthermore, the ECPA and SCA are a “skein of statutory opacity.” FINKIN, supra note 11, at
358. Employees have pursued claims under the ECPA and the SCA based on electronic
monitoring by employers, but most have foundered and failed in the ill-fitting statutory
language. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Cyber-Working or Cyber-Shirking?: A First Principles
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bills that would have minimally regulated electronic monitoring by requiring
employers to give notice before monitoring, but those bills have not become
law,66 and it seems unlikely that they will.
There are many distinctions one can make between employers’ use of
polygraphs and employers’ monitoring of computers and electronic
communications, and those distinctions may well justify Congress’s different
treatment of the two workplace privacy issues. My point is that the EPPA is
a rare federal workplace privacy regulation — an almost absolute ban of
privacy-invading tests used pervasively by employers to protect undisputed
interests. GINA follows the path blazed by the EPPA. Before GINA, the
EPPA stood as the exception to the principle that neither Congress nor the
courts were very sympathetic to employee privacy interests when balanced
against significant employer interests.67 Prior to the passage of GINA, some
commentators paired genetic discrimination with electronic monitoring in
discussions of workplace privacy issues.68 Acquisition and use of genetic
information by employers became regulated, but electronic monitoring has not,
beyond a few state laws.69
GINA’s successful enactment as a workplace privacy law can be explained
in part by reference to the EPPA. Like polygraphs, genetic testing and
screening is a scientific advancement that probes deeply within a person and
lays bare information that a person may prefer to keep private.70 Yet, there are
Examination of Electronic Privacy in the Workplace, 54 FLA. L. REV. 289, 295-99 (2002); Eric
P. Robinson, Big Brother or Modern Management: E-Mail Monitoring in the Private
Workplace, 17 LAB. LAW 311, 313-20 (2001); S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Revisiting the
Public/Private Distinction: Employee Monitoring in the Workplace, 32 GA. L. REV. 825, 839-41
(1998).
66. Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, H.R. 1900, 103d Cong. (1993-94); S. 984,
103d Cong. (1993-94). The bills were introduced in the 1989-90 term and in subsequent terms.
A subsequent version was the Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act (NEMA), H.R. 4908, 106th
Cong. (2000). Business interests killed NEMA in committee. Business Coalition Blocks
Markup of Bill Requiring Electronic Monitoring Notification, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 180,
at A-9 (Sept. 15, 2000). For additional discussion of the bills, see Charles E. Frayer, Note,
Employee Privacy and Internet Monitoring: Balancing Workers’ Rights and Dignity With
Legitimate Management Interests, 57 BUS. LAW. 857 (2002); Kesan, supra note 65, at 299-301;
Amanda Richman, Note, Restoring the Balance: Employer Liability and Employee Privacy, 86
IOWA L. REV. 1337 (2001); Nathan Watson, Note, The Private Workplace and the Proposed
“Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act”: Is “Notice” Enough?, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 79 (2001);
Wilborn, supra note 65, at 850-52.
67. See generally William R. Corbett, The Need for a Revitalized Common Law of the
Workplace, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 91, 107-12 (2003).
68. See, e.g., id.; Bernstein, supra note 11.
69. Connecticut and Delaware have such laws. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48d(b)(1)
(West 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705 (2008).
70. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 11, at 255-59 (discussing popular fears about genetic

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss1/1

2011]

WHAT IS IN GINA’S GENES?

13

differences. Genetic testing may be more accurate than polygraphs, and the
occurrence of inaccurate polygraph results was a major concern with their
use.71 However, the pervasive use of polygraphs at the time that the EPPA was
enacted makes a better case for regulation than the dearth of genetic testing
and screening at the time GINA was enacted.
In the final analysis, the common theme that yokes the EPPA and GINA is
an Orwellian quality about the shredding of the deepest recesses of personal
privacy by scientific and technological probing. This theme alarms people and
resonates with lawmakers, who can campaign for election (or reelection) on
defending the privacy rights of people. With lie detectors and genetic testing,
devices contact and invade people’s bodies and extract information; this is
intimate invasion of the person. As for computer and electronic monitoring,
perhaps the invasion is not as frightening as devices do not act directly upon
people’s bodies. However, although employers’ interests have been prevailing
in electronic monitoring cases and debates to date, the striking of the balance
in that area is far from over.72
IV. Does GINA Signal an Evolutionary Trend In Employment Laws?
GINA is an exceptional antidiscrimination statute because it is
preemptive — meaning that it was enacted without a supporting history of
discrimination.73 Thus, it is a mutant antidiscrimination statute. I have
reconsidered GINA to show that not only is it a mutant, but it is a hybrid
law — part antidiscrimination and part workplace privacy.74
That

testing and discrimination).
71. See S. REP. NO. 100-284, supra note 57.
72. Consider, for example, the cautious qualifying comments of the United States Supreme
Court in City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010):
XX The Court must proceed with care when considering the whole concept of
privacy expectations in communications made on electronic equipment owned by
a government employer. The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the
Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society
has become clear. In Katz[v.United States], the Court relied on its own knowledge
and experience to conclude that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in a
telephone booth. It is not so clear that courts at present are on so sure a ground.
Prudence counsels caution before the facts in the instant case are used to establish
far-reaching premises that define the existence, and extent, of privacy expectations
enjoyed by employees when using employer-provided communication devices.
Id. at 2629.
73. Roberts, supra note 4, passim.
74. GINA may not be the first hybrid, as the ADA also has privacy aspects. However,
GINA is the first hybrid so evenly balanced between privacy and antidiscrimination. The
dominant genes in the ADA are more clearly antidiscrimination.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011

14

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1

characterization, when fully explored, helps explain how a law protecting an
unlikely candidate for employment discrimination coverage was enacted.
In view of the difficulty and controversy involved in enactment of both
federal employment antidiscrimination laws and workplace privacy laws and
the unsuccessful candidates in each category,75 it seems that the hybrid nature
of GINA strengthened it and improved its prospects for becoming law. The
analogy that genetic discrimination is like racial discrimination and they are
equally wrong76 has powerful, if facile, appeal, and this argument permitted
proponents of GINA to “tap the moral authority of the civil rights
movement.”77 The merging of the privacy arguments discussed above with the
antidiscrimination arguments provided a powerful “two-fisted” rationale for
enactment. Although either antidiscrimination or privacy arguments alone
may have failed to carry the day, the pairing proved persuasive.
One lesson from GINA’s ascendancy may be that pure-breed
antidiscrimination laws and privacy laws have less chance of enactment than
the new breed: hybrid antidiscrimination/privacy laws. That brings us to the
provocative question: Is GINA the beginning of a trend or was it a one-time
thing?78
Because I have characterized GINA as a mutant-hybrid
antidiscrimination/privacy law, I ask a variation on that question: Will such
hybrid statutes be an evolutionary trend or a one-time mutation that is unlikely
to be replicated? The successful passage of GINA may tempt advocates of
other causes, such as electronic monitoring regulation, to attempt to follow the
template, but it is hard to see how many other privacy issues could be fitted
with antidiscrimination trappings as effectively as GINA was. Additionally,
there may be no more hybrid antidiscrimination/privacy bills that will garner
the level of political support that the scientific community gave to GINA.79
But before leaving this as a question to be answered in retrospect, let us
consider a possible descendant to carry on GINA’s line: legislation
prohibiting employers from obtaining or using credit history and credit
information. Several states have passed laws significantly restricting the use
of credit history and credit information, and of the four states, two passed such
laws in 2010.80 California recently became the latest state to enact such a
75. See supra Parts II and III.
76. See Kim, supra note 11, at 1501.
77. Id. at 1500.
78. See Roberts, supra note 4, at 490.
79. See supra note 36.
80. Oregon and Illinois in 2010 became the third and fourth states, respectively, joining
Washington and Hawaii, to enact a law imposing restrictions on credit checks for employment
purposes. See Philip L. Gordon, Incipient Legislative Trend Toward “Credit Privacy” Compels
Restraint in Use of Credit Checks for Employment Purposes, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 131,
at I-1 (July 10, 2010) (discussing Oregon’s Job Applicant Fairness Act); Thom Wilder, New
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law.81 As mentioned above, enactment of antidiscrimination laws in a number
of states sometimes presages federal legislation.82 A bill introduced in the U.S.
House in 2009, the Equal Employment for All Act, would amend the federal
Fair Credit Reporting Act83 to prohibit employers and prospective employers
from taking adverse employment actions on the basis of consumer reports
containing information regarding creditworthiness, credit standing, or credit
capacity.84 The credit history and information bills, like GINA, are hybrid
antidiscrimination/privacy laws. The name of the proposed federal law
invokes the antidiscrimination theory of equal treatment without regard for the
protected characteristic. Further establishing the bill’s antidiscrimination
credentials, there have been numerous administrative charges and lawsuits
filed under Title VII asserting that employment decisions based on credit
information were illegal racial discrimination because of their disparate
impact.85 Thus, the antidiscrimination credentials of the credit information
laws are well established. Moreover, the privacy and secrecy of information
aspect is obvious as well.
So, will credit information be the basis of the next mutant-hybrid
antidiscrimination/privacy law, following the lead of GINA? My guess is that
the proposed legislation will not enjoy success comparable to that of GINA for
several reasons: 1) consumer reports and credit information seem more
relevant to many jobs than does genetic information; 2) the important factor
of immutability of the protected characteristic is wholly inapplicable; 3)
assembling and acquiring credit information do not involve the invasive reach
of science into people’s privacy; and 4) the groundswell of state laws has not
yet reached the level that it did before GINA was enacted.
I think that the federal credit history bill will fail, and I can identify few
other progeny of GINA that are likely to become law. I predict that GINA is
a marvelous mutant-hybrid, which will have little practical usefulness and the
likes of which we may never see again.

Illinois Law Bans Employer Inquiries Into Credit History of Employees, Job Seekers, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 155, at A-10 (Aug. 12, 2010).
81. See Laura Mahoney, California Governor Signs Credit Report, Farmworker Bills
Before Midnight Deadline, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 196, at A-10 (Oct. 11, 2011).
82. See discussion accompanying supra notes 39-40.
83. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (2006).
84. See H.R. 3149, 111th Cong. (2009).
85. See generally Steven C. Bednar, Employment Law Dilemmas: What to Do When the
Law Forbids Compliance, 11 UTAH B.J. 15, 17 (Dec. 1998); see also, Press Release, EEOC
Files Nationwide Hiring Discrimination Lawsuit Against Freeman, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc
/newsroom/release/10-1-09b.cfm (detailing EEOC lawsuit alleging racial disparate impact based
on use of credit information).
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Conclusion
GINA is a seminal law in many ways. It is indeed “the first civil rights bill
of the 21st century.”86 It is “the first civil rights bill of the new century of life
sciences.”87 It is the first preemptive federal antidiscrimination law.88 So, it
is a mutant antidiscrimination law. However, it also is the first significant
hybrid privacy-antidiscrimination law. GINA is indeed a strange marvel to
behold. At the end of the day, however, its effectiveness will be dubious and
difficult to gauge, and it is not likely to be replicated in form by other federal
employment laws. The enactment of GINA is a curious case.

86. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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